regulations and does not apply to the powers of local self-government. 3 Nonchartered municipal corporations are required, however, to follow procedural requirements in state law when they exercise their local selfgovernment powers. See "Adoption of charter to exercise local selfgovernment powers," below.
The exact scope of "all powers of local self-government" has not been defi ned by the courts, but numerous cases have established standards for determining what the term includes. A basic standard applied by the Ohio Supreme Court is to determine if an issue has impact outside the territory of the municipal corporation. In 1958, the Court described the limits of the power of local self-government as follows:
The power of local selfg o v e r n m e n t g r a n t e d t o municipalities by Article XVIII relates solely to the government and administration of the internal affairs of the municipality, and, in the absence of [a] statute conferring a broader power, municipal legislation must be confi ned to that area. . . . [citation omitted.] Where a proceeding is such that it affects not only the municipality itself but the surrounding territory beyond its boundaries, such proceeding is no longer one which falls within the sphere of local selfgovernment but is one which must be governed by the general law of the state. 4 And in 1982, the Court further stated:
. . . [P] ursuant to the "statewide concern" doctrine, a municipality may not, in the regulation of local matters, infringe on matters of general and statewide concern. . . . A city may not regulate activities outside its borders, and the state may not restrict the exercise of the powers of self-government within a city. . . . 5 While the courts have not specifically defined the limits of "local self-government," they have found the following to be matters of local self-government:
• Internal organization; • The control, use, and ownership of certain public property;
• Salaries of municipal offi cers and employees;
• Recall of municipal elected offi cials;
• Regulation of municipal streets;
• Procedures for the sale of municipal property.
On the other hand, courts have found the following to be matters of statewide concern and, thus, outside the scope of municipal home rule powers of local self-government:
• Detachment of territory; • Annexation; • Prevailing wage law; • Public employee collective bargaining law. 
Exercise of municipal police powers
The second power granted in Section 3 of Article XVIII is the power to adopt and enforce local police, sanitary, and other similar regulations that are not in conflict with general laws. "Police power" has been defined as the authority to make regulations for the public health, safety, and morals and the general welfare of society. 7 Examples of regulations found to be police regulations include those pertaining to zoning, animal control, fl uoridation of water, traffi c, and "bait and switch" advertising.
Municipal laws for the exercise of municipal police powers may not be in confl ict with general laws. What are "general laws"? Until recently, the Ohio Supreme Court defined those laws as follows:
The words "general laws" as set forth in A statute must (1) be part of a statewide and comprehensive legislative enactment, (2) apply to all parts of the state alike and operate uniformly throughout the state, (3) set forth police, sanitary, or similar regulations, rather than purport only to grant or limit legislative power of a municipal corporation to set forth police, sanitary, or similar regulations, and (4) prescribe a rule of conduct upon citizens generally. 9 Therefore, a state statute that purports only to grant or limit the legislative authority of municipal corporations and does not prescribe a mode of conduct as part of a comprehensive enactment is not a "general law" within the meaning of Section 3 of Article XVIII. For example, a state law that would only prohibit political subdivisions from restricting the ownership, possession, transportation, or transfer of fi rearms or ammunition probably would not be a general law since it would merely limit the legislative authority of a municipal corporation without also providing state standards in those areas. But as the Court ruled in 2008, a comprehensive legislative enactment regulating the authority to carry concealed weapons is a general law.
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Confl icts with general laws
The generally accepted test for determining whether a confl ict exists between a municipal ordinance and a general law was set forth by the Ohio Supreme Court in 1923:
In determining whether an ordinance is in "confl ict" with general laws, the test is whether the ordinance permits or licenses that which the statute forbids and prohibits, and vice versa.
A police ordinance is not in confl ict with a general law upon the same subject merely because certain specifi c acts are declared unlawful by the ordinance, which acts are not referred to in the general law, or because certain specifi c acts are omitted in the ordinance but referred to in the general law, or because different penalties are provided for the same acts, even though greater penalties are imposed by the municipal ordinance. 11 In cases where the municipal ordinance includes a criminal penalty, the Ohio Supreme Court has made it clear that: [w] 
Three-step analytical framework
The Ohio Supreme Court has set forth a three-step home rule analysis concerning many of the concepts addressed thus far. The fi rst step is to determine whether the local ordinance is an exercise of local self-government or an exercise of local police power. If the ordinance relates solely to matters of local self-government, the analysis ends because the Ohio Constitution authorizes a municipal corporation to exercise all powers of local self-government within its jurisdiction. 16 The
If the statute is a general law, the local ordinance must give way if it confl icts with the general law.
The final step is to determine whether the ordinance confl icts with the statute, i.e., whether the ordinance permits or licenses that which the statute forbids, and vice versa. 17 If the ordinance confl icts with the general law, it will be held unconstitutional. If there is no confl ict, 18 the municipal action is permissible even though the statute is a general law. Thus, concurrent exercise of state and local police power is permissible.
The first step of this analytical framework may be an overstatement o r a t l e a s t p r o b l e m a t i c w h e n addressing an exercise of local self-government by a nonchartered municipal corporation. For example, the case does not consider the substance/procedure issues raised in 1980 by Northern Ohio Patrolmen's Benevolent Ass'n v. Parma. It may be that this three-step process is really useful only for examining whether the exercise of a police power confl icts with a general law.
Municipal authority to own and operate utilities
The Ohio Constitution specifically grants municipal corporations the right to operate utilities. Section 4 of Article XVIII reads as follows:
Any municipality may acquire, construct, own, lease and operate within or without its corporate limits, any public utility the products or service of which is or is to be supplied to the municipality or its inhabitants, and may contract with others for any such product or service. The acquisition of any such public utility may be by condemnation or otherwise, and a municipality may acquire thereby the use of, or full title to, the property and franchise of any company or person supplying to the municipality or its inhabitants the service or product of any such utility.
Section 6 of Article XVIII reads as follows:
Any municipality, owning or operating a public utility for the purpose of supplying the service or product thereof to the municipality or its inhabitants, may also sell and deliver to others any transportation service of such utility and the surplus product of any other utility in an amount not exceeding in either case fifty per cent of the total service or product These utility home rule powers are subject to fewer restrictions than the more general home rule powers, but the restrictions discussed below under "Other limitations on municipal home rule power" apply to them. Not every issue that could be found to be a matter of the operation of a utility, however, falls under these utility home rule provisions. For example, in the 1975 fl uoridation case discussed above, fl uoridation of the municipal water supply was found to be a matter of public health-a police power-rather than a matter of the operation of the municipal water utility. The Ohio Supreme Court found that the state's exercise of its police power had only an incidental effect on the municipal corporation's operation of a public utility.
Unlike the other home rule power constitutional provisions, these constitutional utility provisions grant a municipal corporation powers beyond its borders. Municipal cor porations are authorized not only to sell and deliver surplus utility products or services outside their borders, but also to establish and operate utilities in these "outside" areas. And to implement these powers, a municipal corporation is granted, among other powers, eminent domain authority outside its borders.
Other limitations on municipal home rule power
In addition to the limitations in Article XVIII of the Ohio Constitution mentioned above, there are other limitations on a municipal corporation's exercise of home rule powers. A municipal corporation may be limited by the United States Constitution or relevant federal laws. Also, provisions of other articles of the Ohio Constitution limit the exercise of municipal home rule powers.
Several sections in the Ohio Constitution limit municipal power to tax and incur debt. Section 2 of Article XII prohibits the taxation of property in excess of 1% of its true value (ten mills per dollar) unless laws are enacted authorizing the levy of taxes beyond that limitation, either when approved by a vote of the electorate or when provided for by the charter of a municipal corporation.
The General Assembly has enacted legislation authorizing both of these exceptions to this constitutional ten-mill limitation: R.C. 5705.07 authorizes a levy of taxes beyond the ten-mill limitation, and R.C. 5705.18 authorizes a municipal corporation to provide in its charter for a limitation other than the ten-mill limitation.
On the other hand, Section 6 of Article XIII requires the General Assembly to restrict a municipal corporation's powers to tax, assess, borrow money, contract debt, and loan its credit in order to prevent the abuse of these powers. Section 13 of Article XVIII also authorizes the General Assembly to pass laws to limit the power of municipal corporations to levy taxes and incur debt and, further, allows the General Assembly to require reports from municipal corporations as to their financial condition and transactions, to provide for the examination of municipal vouchers, books, and accounts, and to provide for the examination of public undertakings conducted by a municipal authority.
Section 6 of Article VIII prohibits any "city" or "town" from passing laws to become a stockholder in any joint stock company, corporation, or association whatever or to raise money for, or loan credit to or in aid of, any of those entities. (This does not prohibit the insuring of public buildings or property in mutual insurance associations or companies.) However, the Ohio Supreme Court held in 1989 that the lending of credit for a public welfare purpose (in that case, subsidized housing), not a business purpose, did not violate this constitutional provision. Section 1f of Article II reserves for the citizens of each municipal corporation the right to initiative and referendum on all legislative matters. This right cannot be eliminated by a municipal corporation, but the procedures to effectuate this right may be provided for in a municipal charter.
Section 10 of Article XV requires appointments and promotion in the civil service of cities according to merit and fi tness. There is, however, no such requirement for villages. While the Revised Code provides for a municipal civil service in cities, a city may provide for a civil service in its charter instead of following those Revised Code provisions as an exer cise of its constitutional local self-government powers. 20 But in some form, a city must provide for a civil service that meets Article XV's constitutional standards.
Finally, Section 34 of Article II provides that no provision of the Ohio Constitution impairs or limits the power of the General Assembly to pass laws that fi x and regulate the hours of labor, establish a minimum wage, or provide for the comfort, health, safety, and general welfare of all employees. The Ohio Supreme Court has held that laws passed by the General Assembly establishing the Prevailing Wage Law, the Collective Bargaining Law, the Police and Fire Pension Fund, and a law generally prohibiting residency requirements for political subdivision employees are 
Conclusion
The home rule provisions of the Ohio Constitution generally authorize municipal corporations to govern themselves in local municipal matters independent of state law. This authority, however, is not without limitations. Nonchartered municipal corporations must follow procedures set forth in statutes, although chartered municipal corporations may deviate both substantively and procedurally in matters of local selfgovernment. Municipal corporations exercising police powers cannot act in confl ict with general laws. And other provisions of the Ohio Constitution may allow interference from the General Assembly.
It is far easier to set forth general principles gleaned from the abundant case law of home rule jurisprudence than it is to predict an outcome in any given set of circumstances. Although the courts have established some basic principles, some tests, and some analytical frameworks, they do not consistently apply them. There is suffi cient leeway in the tests to reach varying outcomes. Some outcomes are fact specifi c. So, one must exercise caution when finding a case that seems to answer a specifi c home rule question; there may be other cases with different outcomes under similar facts, or the court may not follow precedent, or the case may be limited to its facts, or a later refi nement of a given test may apply. It is diffi cult to simplify this area of law. This is why members are often advised that we cannot be sure how a court will rule on the constitutionality of legislative action affecting municipal corporations. 
